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INTRODUCTION
In order to naturalize as a U.S. citizen, immigrant applicants must
demonstrate, among other requirements, that they possess “good moral character.”1
The contours of this requisite character remain ambiguous, as the statute defines
the term only in the negative using a noninclusive list of statutory bars, such as
* Jennifer Chin and Zeenat Hassan are both graduates of the University of California, Irvine School of
Law, and Scripps College. The authors would like to thank Professor Jennifer Chacón for her guidance,
encouragement, and mentorship on this project. The authors are also grateful to Tarek Hamdi, Jamal
Atalla, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, whose stories and advocacy
provided the inspiration for this note.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012).
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commission of murder and illegal gambling.2 Because the boundaries of the good
moral character (GMC) requirement are not fixed, the assessment of whether an
applicant possesses sufficient character has varied depending on changing societal
values and mores.3 Applicants must guess how to affirmatively demonstrate GMC;
often, applicants point to their charitable donations and involvement with religious
and civic organizations as evidence of good character.4
But for many Muslim immigrants, involvement with Islamic organizations
leads to difficulties in the naturalization process. Post-9/11 Islamophobia has been
accompanied by suspicion that all Islamic charities are fronts for terrorist
organizations.5 Consequently, Muslim applicants for naturalization bear not only
the burden of demonstrating GMC in a way palatable to naturalization examiners
but also of explaining, minimizing, or apologizing for cultural and religious
affiliations.
A glaring disconnect exists between the stated purpose of the GMC
requirement and its practical effect on how citizenship is conceptualized and
dispensed among members of the national community. This Note argues that the
federal government’s use of the GMC requirement as a basis for denying
naturalization claims functions to exclude Muslims from citizenship on the basis of
their religious and cultural affiliations. Exclusion from citizenship keeps Muslim
and Arab immigrants at the margins of American society and bars them from full
participation in the civic sphere.
We begin this Note by providing an overview of the conditions the United
2. Id. § 1101(f ) (listing statutory bars to a finding of good moral character). “The fact that any
person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such
person is or was not of good moral character.” Id.
3. 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 95.04 (Matthew
Bender ed., rev. ed. 2015).
4. See, e.g., In re [Identifying Information Redacted by Agency] Application: Application for
Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under
section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) (Sept. 15,
2009), 2009 WL 4983107 (DHS) (applicant brought evidence establishing her volunteer service and
donations to show good moral character); In re [Identifying Information Redacted by Agency]
Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (Sept. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 5237056 (DDHS)
(immigration judge considered “evidence of service in the community, including donations to charities
and participation in committees to improve services to the Latino community” as evidence of good
character); In re [Identifying Information Redacted by Agency] Petition: Petition for Immigrant Abused
Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (May 14, 2008), 2008 WL 4051965 (petitioner supplied receipt of donation to
Goodwill as evidence of Good Moral Character).
5. See Laila Al-Marayati, American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L.
REV. 321, 321 (2005) (“The U.S. government has not obtained a single terrorist conviction of any of
the principals of these [Muslim charities based in the United States] nor has the government proven
conclusively that any of the funds were used to finance activities at all related to the events of 9/11 or
to al-Qaeda. Yet, the government continues to display its closures of Muslim charities as evidence of
progress being made in the War on Terror.”); Walter Pincus, Foreign Aid Groups Face Terror Screens, WASH.
POST (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/22/
AR2007082202847.html [http://perma.cc/R4XK-LLT4].
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States imposes on applicants seeking naturalization, focusing on the GMC
requirement. Part II discusses the post-9/11 political landscape for Muslim
naturalization applications and uses two case studies, the stories of Tarek Hamdi
and Jamal Atalla, to explore the way in which the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has operationalized the GMC requirement to deny American citizenship to
Muslim Americans. Part III critiques the use of the GMC requirement as a tool to
deny citizenship and argues that it functions, in effect if not also in purpose, as a
state-sponsored mechanism to disempower a vilified immigrant group in the name
of national security. Finally, Part IV provides concrete proposals for modification
of the GMC requirement.
I.

TO WHOM SHOULD WE GRANT CITIZENSHIP?
A. The Process of Naturalization

For many permanent resident aliens in the United States, the process of
applying for naturalization and citizenship is administrative and ministerial in
nature.6 To walk permanent residents through the naturalization process, the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)7 publishes A Guide to Naturalization,
the first section of which welcomes applicants for citizenship, expresses pleasure at
the prospect of a new U.S. citizen, and recognizes the country’s immigrant roots.8
The guide also highlights benefits of naturalization, including the following
privileges: voting in federal elections; getting priority when petitioning to bring
family members permanently to the United States; obtaining citizenship for children
born abroad; travelling with a U.S. passport; becoming eligible for federal jobs and
elected office; and showing patriotism for the United States.9
Current immigration laws provide that aliens must meet ten basic
requirements for citizenship eligibility, including requirements that an applicant
have permanent resident status and the ability to meet both continuous residence
and good moral character requirements. 10 Once an applicant meets these
6. As a starting point, however, the authors note that most citizens acquire citizenship status
without even the administrative or ministerial showing required by the naturalization process “as a result
of good fortune in having been born at the right place or to the right parents.” 7 GORDON ET AL., supra
note 3, § 91.01.
7 . The Executive Branch of the U.S. government has plenary power over questions of
immigration. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
Furthermore, international law generally defers to nation states to determine its membership through
admission and deportation policies. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens:
Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 64–65 (2004).
8. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 1 (2012),
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/M-476.pdf [http://perma.cc/UF67-AGRH] [hereinafter USCIS,
A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION].
9. Id. at 2.
10. The requirements include:
(1) the applicant must be admitted to permanent resident status; (2) the applicant must have
a continuous residence in the United States for a minimum period (normally five years); (3)
the applicant must be residing in the state of application for a minimum period of three
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requirements, he or she is eligible to submit an N-400 application for citizenship.11
Running ten pages, the N-400 application asks citizenship applicants for basic
biographical information, 12 such as their name, contact information, residence,
employment, and physical characteristics for purposes of an FBI criminal records
search.13 The application also asks detailed questions about the applicant’s marital
history, children, and time spent outside of the United States.14
Nearly a full page of the application focuses on the applicant’s affiliations,
asking applicants to list every “organization, association, fund, foundation, party,
club, society, or similar group” the applicant has ever “been a member of, involved
in, or in any way associated with” anywhere in the world.15 Another full page of the
application is dedicated to character questions, including pointed questions about
crime, habitual drinking, prostitution, polygamy, gambling, supporting dependents,
and giving false or misleading information to obtain an immigration benefit.16
The USCIS initially has sole authority to grant or deny a naturalization
application.17 In April 2002, USCIS officers began checking the names of foreign
nationals seeking immigration benefits against the Interagency Border Inspection
System, a multiagency database of lookout information.18 Naturalization applicants
also undergo FBI fingerprinting and name checks as part of the N-400 application
process.19 Furthermore, applicants identified as “national security concerns” by the
FBI receive heightened review under the Controlled Application Review and
Resolution Program (CARRP) instituted in 2008. 20 As a result of this security
months; (4) the applicant must have been physically present in the United States for a
minimum period (at least half the period of required continuous residence); (5) the applicant
must have the ability to read, write and speak ordinary English; (6) the applicant must have
knowledge of U.S. history and government; (7) the applicant must have good moral character; (8)
the applicant must have continuous residence in the U.S. from the date of filing the
naturalization application until actual admission to citizenship; (9) the applicant must have
attained 18 years of age at the time of filing for naturalization (subject to certain exceptions);
(10) the applicant must be attached to the principles of the U.S. Constitution.
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK § 22:9 (2015) (emphasis
added).
11. USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 8, at 1.
12 .
The N-400 application is available online through the USCIS. Application for
Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/
files/form/n-400.pdf [http://perma.cc/FQ4T-6SE6].
13. Id. at 2–4.
14. Id. at 4–6.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 8.
17. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 10, § 22:25.
18. Id. (discussing a USCIS policy memorandum); see also Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham,
The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims in America, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 83, 84–92 (2007).
19. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-06-06, A REVIEW OF
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES’ ALIEN SECURITY CHECKS (2005).
20. JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., MUSLIMS NEED NOT
APPLY: HOW USCIS SECRETLY MANDATES THE DISCRIMINATORY DELAY AND DENIAL OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION BENEFITS TO ASPIRING AMERICANS 11 (2013), http://
www.aclusocal.org/CARRP/ [http://perma.cc/QZ6N-ZUCC] (follow “Download the Report”
hyperlink).
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screening, the processing of naturalization applications and petitions slowed
considerably across the country.21
Following completion of security checks, USCIS schedules an interview with
the naturalization applicant, called the naturalization examination.22 These exams
include three parts: a test of the applicant’s ability to read, write, and speak English;
a test of the applicant’s knowledge of the U.S. government and U.S. history; and an
adjudicator’s review of the N-400 application for accuracy and completeness.23 If
an applicant meets all the statutory requirements for naturalization, an adjudicator
must grant the application.24 This decision must be made within 120 days,25 and
though processing times vary, USCIS aims for the naturalization process to average
six months from the filing of a naturalization application.26 The last step in the
naturalization process is a naturalization ceremony, where the applicant returns his
or her permanent resident card, takes the oath of allegiance, and receives a
certificate of naturalization.27
Applicants denied citizenship may request an administrative hearing before a
different immigration officer within thirty days of receiving his or her notice of
denial.28 More formal than initial naturalization interviews, administrative review
hearings often involve legal representation, submission of written briefs,
subpoenaed witnesses, and presentations of evidence.29 The 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) also provides for de novo federal court review of a final
administrative denial, which all but requires legal assistance.30
B. The Good Moral Character Requirement
For many, the GMC requirement is an automatic, insignificant part of the
naturalization process. However, the requirement has proven persistent—Congress
has required applicants for American citizenship to show affirmative proof of good
character before naturalizing as citizens of the United States since passing the first

21. Id.; see FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 10, § 22:25; Musabji & Abraham, supra note 18, at 84–
92 (discussing the CAIR litigation challenging the FBI’s name check programs that have indefinitely
delayed thousands of naturalization applications, of whom “an overwhelming number” are Muslim); see
also Yakubova v. Chertoff, No. 06CV3203(ERK)(RLM), 2006 WL 6589892 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006).
22. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 72.3(e)(1)
(2012), http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html [http://
perma.cc/5BD2-94ZF] [hereinafter USCIS, FIELD MANUAL].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 335.3 (2015).
26. USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 8, at 10.
27. Id. at 31.
28. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 10, § 22:26.
29. Id.
30. Id.

Chin & Hassan_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

950

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

12/11/2015 10:57 PM

[Vol. 5:945

naturalization statute in 1790.31 Balancing the nascent country’s republican ideals32
and need for growth and labor33 with the virulent xenophobia and nativism of its
representatives, 34 the first Congress extensively debated the merits of various
prenaturalization requirements and the types of citizens these requirements would
attract. 35 Georgian Representative James Jackson introduced the idea that
prospective citizens should serve a probationary period of residency, and be
required to bring testimonials of proper and decent behavior in order to naturalize.36
Concerned with the respectability and character of the American name, Jackson
hoped this requirement would allow the title of a “citizen of America” to become
as “highly venerated and respected as was that of a citizen of old Rome.”37 Though
Jackson recognized that “the difficulty will be to determine how a proper certificate
of good behavior should be obtained,” 38 Congress adopted his proposal as a
requirement that applicants for citizenship make proof to the satisfaction of a
common law court of record that “he is a person of good character.”39
Five years later, Congress repealed the 1790 Act, raising the residency
requirement for naturalization to five years, and requiring a resident alien to show
that he “has behaved as a man of good moral character” for two years prior to
admission as a citizen. 40 Insertion of the word “moral” into the character
requirement initially drew opposition because of the possible religious connotations
associated with the word. 41 However, representatives quickly attacked this
31. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed Jan. 29, 1795) (“[A]ny alien,
being a free white person, . . . may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any
common law court of record, . . . and making proof to the satisfaction of such court, that he is a person
of good character . . . .”).
32. Representative Page, for example, noted that after having boasted of “having opened an
asylum for the oppressed of all nations, and established a Government which is the admiration of the
world,” that high bars of admission to “the full enjoyment of that asylum” would be inconsistent with
the stated principles of the nation. Rule of Naturalization, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109, 1110 (1790)
( Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Representative Page continued, saying further that “[i]t is nothing to us,
whether Jews or Roman Catholics settle amongst us; whether subjects of Kings, or citizens of free
States wish to reside in the United States, they will find it their interest to be good citizens, and neither
their religious nor political opinions can injure us, if we have good laws, well executed.” Id.
33. Representative Burke, for example, stressed the importance of “fill[ing] the country with
useful men, such as farmers, mechanics, and manufacturers,” advocating for “every encouragement to
them to emigrate to America.” Id. at 1117.
34. Id. at 1112. Representative Smith cautioned that if emigrants are easily admitted into civic
life, it “may create great uneasiness in neighborhoods which have been long accustomed to live in peace
and unity.” Id.; see id. at 1117 (stating that Representative Sedgwick was “against the indiscriminate
admission of foreigners,” preferring higher naturalization standards to ensure that America was not
“overrun with the outcasts of Europe”); see also Comment, The Evaluation of Good Moral Character in
Naturalization Proceedings, 38 ALB. L. REV. 895, 895 (1974) (recognizing that representatives were wary
of an “influx of undesirable aliens”).
35. Comment, supra note 34, at 896.
36. Rule of Naturalization, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1114.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed Jan. 29, 1795).
40. Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat 414, 415 (repealed Apr. 14, 1802).
41. Naturalization Bill, 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1026, 1026 (1794); Lauren Gilbert, Citizenship, Civic
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opposition as slanderous to the American character. 42 Massachusetts
Representative Theodore Sedgwick clarified that the word “moral” had “no
particular reference whatever to religion,” and was defined in opposition to immoral
rather than in relation or reference to religious opinions.43 According to Sedgwick,
neither “good”44 nor “moral”45 would be difficult to distinguish or define.
Despite Representative Sedgwick’s optimism, interpretation of the boundaries
of this “good moral character” statutory requirement for naturalization proved
highly variable, tricky to standardize, and difficult to determine over time. With no
affirmative definition of “good moral character” advanced in either the 1790 or
1795 naturalization statutes, district courts across the country developed
inconsistent formulations and tests for assessing whether applicants for citizenship
held the requisite character. 46 In fact, “good moral character” became a quality
determined more easily in its breach than in its observance, and defined by the
exclusion of bad character rather than by complete incorporation of good or moral
character traits.47
Between 1795 and 1952, when weighing the character of an applicant’s
conduct, courts relied on proxies, such as federal and state criminal laws, moral
standards prevailing in the alien’s community, or moral standards current
nationwide, as the basis for determining good and bad conduct.48 During this time,
scholars vigorously debated the relative merits of these differing court-developed
standards as well as other possible ways to determine good moral character. At the
turn of the twentieth century, for example, scholars argued whether the good moral

Virtue, and Immigrant Integration: The Enduring Power of Community-Based Norms, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
335, 351–52 (2009); Steven L. Strange, Private Consensual Sexual Conduct and the “Good Moral Character”
Requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 358 n.4 (1975).
42. Naturalization Bill, 4 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1026.
43. Id.
44. Id. (“The word good, itself, is very equivocal in its meaning.”).
45. Id. (“We can everywhere tell, by the common voice of the World, whether a man is moral
or not in his life, without difficulty.”).
46. Albert S. Persichetti, Good Moral Character as a Requirement for Naturalization, 22 TEMP. L.Q.
182, 185 (1948) (discussing the lack of uniformity in GMC determinations, and urging attorneys to
determine the attitude of the particular court before filing a petition for naturalization on behalf of a
client).
47. Comment, supra note 34, at 896; see also Persichetti, supra note 46, at 184 (commenting that
specific acts of bad behavior tend to establish lack of GMC, and that it follows that an absence of bad
behavior would indicate the presence of good moral character); Elmer Plischke, “Good Moral Character”
in the Naturalization Law of the United States, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 117, 118 (1939) (“Unfortunately a negative
approach must be taken, determining what does not constitute ‘good moral character,’ rather than what
does.”).
48. Rachel A. Hexter, Naturalization—“Good Moral Character” Requirement Is a Question of Federal
Law, Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981), 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 383, 385 (1982); see also
Comment, supra note 34, at 907 (discussing the National Standards Test, the Local Standards Test, and
a Hybrid Test used by courts to determine good moral character); Clayton Lilienstern, Note, An Alien
Is Not To Be Denied Naturalization on the Ground of Lack of Good Moral Character When He Has Committed
Adultery if Extenuating Circumstances Exist, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 558, 558–59 (1967) (discussing the national
and local standards tests for GMC).
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character determination should be an objective or subjective standard, 49 and
whether the good moral character naturalization criterion should be more or less
restrictive.50 In the mid-twentieth century, scholars and jurists disagreed over which
decision makers would be best situated to make the good moral character
determination. 51 Whether influenced by these arguments or not, the courts
gradually relaxed earlier, more rigorous, good moral character standards in light of
perceived moral trends in the decades leading up to 1950.52
In an effort to achieve a more uniform approach to naturalization,53 Congress
added an enumerated list of statutory bars to showing good moral character in the
definitional section of the INA,54 otherwise known as the McCarran-Walter Act.55
Although the statute again avoided comprehensive definition of “good moral
character,” the list of statutory bars generally attempted, in each case, to “negate a
specific court decision” 56 and included conduct that Congress believed was
universally recognized as socially unacceptable.57 Congress enacted the McCarranWalter Act over President Truman’s veto. 58 The President subsequently
commissioned the Commission on Immigration and Naturalization in 1953, which

49. See Naturalization, 19 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1906) (disagreeing with a 1905 article by Henry
Stockbridge that argued the GMC inquiry should be subjective—stating that an applicant need not
actually possess GMC, but must only prove that he has behaved as one possessing GMC).
50. See id. at 393 (“Surely one instance of yielding to the common propensity for doing what
the crowd does, is not necessarily behavior incompatible with good character and a belief in the
Constitution.”); cf. W.G.S., Qualifications of Aliens for Naturalization, 8 MICH. L. REV. 42, 44 (1909)
(arguing that the danger is in a liberal interpretation of naturalization laws rather than a strict
interpretation, and asserting that the standard for aliens should be higher than “some of our nativeborn citizens could meet” because naturalization is a “privilege and not the right of the alien”).
51. Note, Judicial Determination of Moral Conduct in Citizenship Hearings, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 138,
139 (1948) ( Judge Learned Hand and Judge Frank agreed that they did not want to make the moral
standard decision, and the article suggests possible alternatives such as (i) an advisory group of ethical
leaders, (ii) a general poll, or (iii) a jury.); cf. Recent Decisions, Aliens—Naturalization—Period of Good
Behaviour, 35 VA. L. REV. 264, 265 (1949) (arguing that, in any given case, the court is in the best position
to appraise the character of the petitioner and should therefore be allowed to exercise broad judicial
discretion in the GMC determination).
52 . PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME, at xi (1953).
53. Hexter, supra note 48, at 386; Strange, supra note 41, at 358 n.4.
54. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 172 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012)) (“For the purposes of this Act—No person shall be
regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good
moral character is required to be established is, or was—(1) a habitual drunkard; (2) one who during
such a period has committed adultery . . . (4) one whose income is derived principally from illegal
gambling activities; (5) one who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses committed
during such period; (6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits
under this Act; (7) one who during such period has been confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal
institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or more . . . (8) one who at any time
has been convicted of the crime of murder.”).
55. Strange, supra note 41, at 357.
56. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, supra note 52, at 246.
57. Hexter, supra note 48, at 383.
58. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, supra note 52, at xi.
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disagreed with Congress’s approach and found the statutory bars narrow and
inflexible. 59 The Commission recommended that the statute continue to require
naturalization applicants to establish good moral character without defining the
term.60
Despite the Commission’s recommendations, the statutory bars have
remained a part of the INA, and since 1952, arguments have centered on the
addition or removal of statutory bars to an applicant’s showing of good moral
character. Scholars have argued, for example, that former Nazi concentration camp
guards cannot show good moral character. 61 They have also argued for the removal
of adultery as a statutory bar if extenuating circumstances exist to justify the
adultery.62 Congress, responding to these concerns and others, has amended the per
se bars to remove adultery and convictions of a single offense of simple possession
of not more than thirty grams of marijuana as absolute bars to findings of good
moral character.63 Courts continue to show flexibility in the application of the good
moral character requirement.64
In 1990, Congress transferred the authority to grant naturalization from the
courts to the Attorney General.65 Although courts maintain jurisdiction to review
naturalization denials de novo,66 USCIS administrators now decide the vast majority
of naturalization applications. 67 As a result, transparency in the naturalization
process has dropped tremendously, as has the volume of federal district court
opinions addressing good moral character. As Law Professor Lauren Gilbert has
recognized, this change has hindered the ability of lawyers and researchers to
identify, evaluate, and challenge the standards that naturalization examiners use in
determining good moral character.68
Now, the good moral character provision is deployed to deny naturalization
to applicants whose conducts or acts “offend the accepted moral character
standards of the community in which the applicant resides” during or before the
five years prior to applying for citizenship.69 The limited statutory period for the
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id. at 246.
61. K. Lesli Ligorner, Note, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals “Good Moral Character”?:
United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145, 193 (1997).
62. Lilienstern, supra note 48, at 562.
63. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1981, 16 INT’L MIGRATION REV.
206, 207 (1982).
64. See, e.g., Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435–36 (4th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply local
standards when petitioner lived in a state that prohibited private, consensual sodomy between adults).
65. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit 4, sec. 401, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 4978,
5038; see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 1300 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).
66. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(b)–(c) (2012).
67. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 65, at 1300 (discussing the change and using
“administrative naturalization” rather than the familiar “judicial naturalization” to describe
naturalization by application).
68. Gilbert, supra note 41, at 359.
69. Though the statutory period is five years, see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3), the USCIS Adjudicator’s
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good moral character requirement, combined with authorization for consideration
of acts conducted before the statutory period, shows clear congressional intent to
allow adjudicators to consider evidence of reformation in determining good moral
character.70
II. CITIZENSHIP AFTER 9/11
A. The Political Landscape
The September 11, 2001, World Trade Center terrorist attacks sparked an
increasingly negative attitude toward Muslim Americans in the United States and a
widespread demonization of Muslim immigrants.71 Since 9/11, Muslim Americans
have reported pervasive threats of violence and intimidation, hate crimes,
harassment, and religious and racial profiling in communities across the country.72
This wave of negative public opinion and backlash against Muslim Americans has
required practicing Muslims to publicly and repeatedly condemn the acts of 9/11
and explain that Islam prohibits terrorism, 73 as well as demonstrate their
“goodness” in opposition to the “bad Muslim” radical extremists that orchestrated
9/11.74
Field Manual instructs adjudicators to consider conduct prior to that period, USCIS, FIELD MANUAL,
supra note 22, § 73.6(a).
70. 7 GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 95.01[1][a] (“The purpose of [the] provision [allowing
adjudicators to take into account conduct before the statutory period] is to determine whether the
applicant has actually reformed.” (citing Tieri v. INS, 457 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1972)).
71. This negative attitude has manifested against Muslim Americans broadly, though Muslim
immigrants can be of any race, ethnicity, geographic origin, and political persuasion. LORI PEEK,
BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11, at 9 (2011). Estimates of the Muslim
American population have ranged from two to seven million, Nina J. Crimm, The Moral Hazard of AntiTerrorism Financing Measures: A Potential to Compromise Civil Societies and National Interests, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 577, 592–93 (2008), with Islam as the fastest growing religion in the United States, PEEK, supra,
at 10, 14.
72. See generally PEEK, supra note 71, at 16 (“[This book] documents the verbal harassment;
violent threats and intimidation; physical assault; religious profiling; and employment, educational, and
housing discrimination that Muslims faced following 9/11.”); id. at 6 (discussing media attacks by
television commentators, talk radio hosts, and authors on the Qur’an, Muslim immigration to the
United States, and the “Islamic menace” more generally). But see BRIGITTE L. NACOS & OSCAR
TORRES-REYNA, FUELING OUR FEARS: STEREOTYPING, MEDIA COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC OPINION
OF MUSLIM AMERICANS 26 (2007) (recognizing that the news stories that painted American Muslims
and Arabs in a negative light decreased from nearly one-third before 9/11 to less than one-fourth
immediately afterward, though the news stories switched to overwhelmingly negative portrayals of
American Muslims surrounding and after the one-year anniversary of 9/11).
73. PEEK, supra note 71, at 24–26 (describing efforts by the Council on American-Islamic
Relations, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the Muslim Students Association National, Muslim and
Arab leaders, prominent Islamic religious leaders in the United States, major Arab and Muslim
American advocacy groups, and organized groups of individual Muslims to speak out against terrorism).
In fact, President George W. Bush, other politicians, and media pundits publicly called for Muslim
Americans to affirmatively demonstrate their allegiance or loyalty to the United States in the aftermath
of 9/11. Id. at 147.
74. See Engle, supra note 7, at 62 (discussing ways of demonstrating that one is a good alien or
citizen). “Posting American flags on homes, cars, and shops, happily submitting to interrogations and
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Declaring a “Global War on Terror” 75 in response to the 9/11 attacks,
Congress and the George W. Bush administration quickly enacted counterterrorism
legislation, 76 developed preventive counterterrorism policies, 77 and pursued
aggressive prosecutions of Muslim charities thought to finance global terrorist
activities.78 As detailed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in a 2009
report titled Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling Muslim Charitable Giving in the “War
on Terrorism Financing,” the federal government has used raids, secret evidence,
Department of Treasury asset-freezing blocking orders, and nontransparent
procedures and criteria to designate American Muslim charities as terrorist
organizations. 79 Although the Department of Treasury has seized the assets of
seven U.S.-based American Muslim charities, designating them as terrorist
organizations, only three of these organizations have faced criminal prosecution,
and only one of the three prosecutions resulted in conviction.80 Scholars and the 9/
11 Commission have criticized the vast overbreadth and procedural deficiencies of
the “material support for terrorism” statutes,81 though the Supreme Court upheld

searches at the airport, responding to President Bush’s call to be vigilant and watch one’s neighbors,
and—particularly if one is Muslim—continually condemning terrorism while avoiding discussion of
United States foreign policy in the Middle East, all provide opportunities for demonstrating loyalty.”
Id.
75. This term was adopted by the President George W. Bush administration shortly after the
9/11 attacks, but is now disfavored. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War On Terror’ Is Given New
Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html [http://perma.cc/HZC6-ARWP].
76. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
77. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventative Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11
America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 430–34 (2012).
78. Crimm, supra note 71, at 603–04 (discussing attempts by the United States to designate
individuals and groups as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs), specially designated nationals
(SDNs), or material supporters of SDGTs and SDNs pursuant to authority granted by the International
Emergency and Economic Powers Act and the USA Patriot Act); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE “WAR ON
TERRORISM FINANCING” 7 (2009), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith.pdf [http://
perma.cc/245J-JRH5] [hereinafter ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH].
79. ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH, supra note 78, at 7.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id. at 10–11 (“A 9/11 Commission staff report on terrorism financing found that the laws
that allow the Treasury Department to designate and seize the assets of charities raise ‘substantial civil
liberty concerns.’”); Al-Marayati, supra note 5, at 337–38 (“The ever present threat of the ‘terrorist
designation’ issued by the Treasury Department functions based on the principle of ‘guilty until proven
innocent.’ The use of secret evidence, hearsay, erroneous translations, guilt by association and press
reports in recent court cases further erodes the ability of charities to rely on basic assumptions regarding
their constitutional rights, especially when the courts ultimately favor the government when ‘national
security’ allegedly is at stake.”); Aziz, supra note 77, at 459–60 (“Material support laws are so broad and
vaguely worded that they effectively criminalize a myriad of activities that would otherwise be
constitutionally protected.”). But see Jennifer Lynn Bell, Terrorist Abuse of Non-Profits and Charities: A
Proactive Approach to Preventing Terrorist Financing, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 450, 452 (2008) (arguing
that the government should adopt a more active role in monitoring terror financing).
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the statutes as consistent with the First Amendment.82 Additionally, independent
reviews conducted in the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Luxembourg have
cleared some of the designated organizations, chastising the U.S. government for
“its inability to show any proof of terrorism funding in the cases under review.”83
Although the blatant prejudice toward Islam has somewhat dissipated with the
transition from President George W. Bush to President Barack Obama, the
continuing War on Terror has perpetuated the implementation of policies that have
a disparate impact on, and in some cases directly target, the Muslim community in
the United States.84
Increased scrutiny of Muslim American charity organizations by the U.S.
government has significantly impacted charitable donations in the Muslim
American community.85 As documented by the ACLU, there is a
pervasive fear among Muslim charitable donors that they may be arrested,
retroactively prosecuted for donations made in good faith to legal Muslim
charities, targeted for law enforcement interviews . . . , subpoenaed to
testify in a criminal case, subjected to surveillance, deported or denied
citizenship or a green card, or otherwise implicated because of charitable
donations made in fulfillment of their religious obligation to give Zakat
[the Islamic concept of charity or alms].86
Two recent federal district court appeals of administrative citizenship naturalization
application denials, brought by Muslim Americans, denied citizenship because of
donations made to Muslim charities prior to the designation of the charities as
“terrorist organizations” by the Treasury Department, show that this fear is
justified. 87 In both of these cases, Atalla v. Kraemer and Hamdi v. United States

82. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24–39 (2010); see also Sumeet H. Chugani,
Comment, Benevolent Blood Money: Terrorist Exploitation of Zakat and Its Complications in the War on Terror,
34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 601, 638 (2009) (“The courts have consistently found that terrorist
designations and blocking orders do not violate a charity’s right to speech, association, or free exercise
of religion. In multiple instances, First Amendment freedom of religion claims were considered moot
because the charitable organizations had failed to hold themselves out as religious-based organizations.”
(citations omitted)).
83. ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH, supra note 78, at 11.
84. See, e.g., PASQUARELLA, supra note 20.
85. Crimm, supra note 71, at 620 (discussing the chilling effect of Executive Order 13,224 and
the USA Patriot Act on Muslim-Americans’ philanthropic and charitable wealth redistributions and on
operations of U.S.-based Islamic charities); see also Joseph McMahon, Developments in Regulations of NGOs
via Government Counter-Terrorism Measures and Policies, 11 INT’L NGO TRAINING & RES. CENTRE 4 (2007),
http://www.intrac.org/resources.php?action=resource&id=299 [http://web.archive.org/web/2010
0706031048/http://www.intrac.org/resources.php?action=resource&id=299] (follow “Developments
in the regulation of NGOs” hyperlink) (citing Neil MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S.
Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/us/30CHARITY
.html).
86. PASQUARELLA, supra note 20, at 13; see also Chugani, supra note 82, at 602.
87. See Hamdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. EDCV 10-894 VAP (DTBx), 2012
WL 632397 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2012); Atalla v. Kramer, No. CV09-1610-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL
2457492 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Atalla v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 541 F.
App’x 760 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Citizenship and Immigration Services, the government argued that the applicants could
not demonstrate that they possessed GMC because they “associated with” terrorist
organizations via donations given through their mosques and provided false
testimony by failing to disclose these associations.88 The Atalla and Hamdi cases
show that Muslim charitable donations are used not only by the DHS to prosecute
Muslim immigrants for “material support of terrorism,” but also by USCIS to raise
suspicions of terror-related activities in order to deny immigration benefits to
Muslim applicants.
B. Tarek Hamdi
In 1977, Tarek Hamdi immigrated to the United States from Egypt.89 While
studying at Northeastern University on a student visa, he met Linda Carriere, a U.S.
citizen.90 They married in 1987 and raised four U.S. citizen daughters together.91 At
the time of Hamdi’s applications for citizenship, Hamdi worked as a civil engineer
in a construction company.92
Hamdi obtained lawful permanent resident status in 1988 and, in 2001, he
applied to naturalize as a U.S. citizen.93 Although his application was approved in
November 2002, USCIS failed to schedule Hamdi for an oath interview.94 Two
months later, an FBI agent asked Hamdi to meet him at a doughnut shop to discuss
his involvement with the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF),95 a thenexempt not-for-profit organization whose stated purpose was to conduct
humanitarian relief projects throughout the world.96 The interview was conducted
as a part of the FBI’s investigation into BIF, and Hamdi was not placed under oath
or affirmation;97 however, during the course of the interview, FBI Special Agent
Michael Caputo questioned Hamdi about his personal connection to BIF and
donations he made to the organization.98 In March 2003, USCIS learned of the FBI

88. Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *4; Atalla, 541 F. App’x at 762.
89. Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *14.
93. Id. at *2–3.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. at *10.
96. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Benevolence International
Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism (Nov. 19, 2002), http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3632.aspx [http://perma.cc/H286-L2PY]. In 2003, Enaam
Arnaout, the leader of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), pleaded guilty to a charge of
“racketeering fraud conspiracy committed in operation of a charity.” United States v. Arnaout, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 838, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2003). In a written plea agreement and through evidence introduced at
Arnaout’s plea hearing, Arnaout admitted to defrauding BIF donors by using BIF funds, raised for
humanitarian purposes only, for Arnaout’s own undisclosed support to militia efforts in Bosnia and
Chechnya. Id. at 842 (“Arnaout ignores the fact that he consistently represented to donors and
government authorities that BIF supported only humanitarian causes.”).
97. Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *5.
98. Id.
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interview and reopened Hamdi’s case to reevaluate the decision to grant him
naturalization.99 Two years later, in May 2005, government counsel asked the FBI
agent who interviewed Hamdi in 2003 to prepare a declaration that described their
conversation. 100 USCIS then scheduled Hamdi for a second naturalization
interview, which Hamdi missed because he did not receive the notice in time.101
USCIS denied Hamdi’s application for naturalization on the grounds that he failed
to appear for the interview.102
In 2007, Hamdi applied once again for naturalization and passed the
citizenship examination the following year.103 USCIS Immigration Service Officer
Robert Osuna interviewed Hamdi in November 2008 regarding his application.104
When USCIS had not reached a decision by March 2009, Hamdi filed a lawsuit in
U.S. district court seeking to compel adjudication under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).105 The
court granted the relief sought, and ordered USCIS to adjudicate Hamdi’s
application no later than June 15, 2009.106
On June 8, 2009, USCIS denied Hamdi’s application for naturalization on the
basis that Hamdi lacked the requisite “good moral character.”107 Officer Osuna
testified that he denied the application “on the basis that [Hamdi] gave false
testimony during his interview on November 8, 2008, regarding his alleged
affiliation with [BIF], the identity of his last employer, and his employment
status.”108
Hamdi appealed the denial by filing an N-336 Request for a Hearing on
Decision in Naturalization. 109 Two USCIS officers interviewed Hamdi in
September 2009 and denied the petition on the basis that he gave false testimony
regarding BIF on his application and during his interviews.110
Represented by the ACLU of Southern California, Hamdi filed a petition in
U.S. district court, requesting that the court grant him American citizenship
pursuant to the court’s authority under 8 U.S.C. §1421(c).111 After a two-day trial in
February 2012,112 the court found Hamdi statutorily eligible for naturalization under
the INA, and ordered USCIS to grant Hamdi’s application for naturalization.113

99. See id. at *2.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. at *2–3.
102. Id.
103. Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Petition at 1–2, Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397 (No. EDCV 10-894 VAP (DTBx)), ECF No. 1.
112. Id.
113. Order & Judgment at 1–2, Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397 (No. EDCV 10-894 VAP (DTBx)),
ECF No. 129.
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Hamdi was officially sworn in as an American citizen on May 10, 2012114—more
than ten years after his initial application for citizenship.
C. Jamal Atalla
Born to Palestinian refugees in Syria, Dr. Jamal Atalla graduated from the
Damascus University School of Medicine in 1991.115 He moved to the United States
in 1992 with his wife, Dr. Nadia Katrangi, to obtain medical specialties in internal
medicine, nephrology, kidney diseases, and interventional nephrology.116 Pursuing
these advanced trainings, Dr. Atalla attended the University of New York at Buffalo,
the University of Kentucky, and the University of Missouri at Columbia, finally
working at Indiana Nephrology and finishing his subspecialty training at the
Arizona Kidney Disease and Hypertension Center (AKDHC) in Phoenix,
Arizona.117 According to Dr. Atalla’s supervisor, the CEO of the AKDHC, Atalla
is “a very good man, very honest, very kind, considerate. He’s brilliant. He’s easy to
talk to. He listens well.”118
A father of four children, all born in the United States, Dr. Atalla has
volunteered on the board of directors for the Muslim Youth Center for Arizona as
well as the Arizona Cultural Academy, where his children received their
schooling. 119 He regularly volunteered free medical services to indigent patients
from underserved populations, volunteered time at soup kitchens, and visited the
elderly in nursing homes with his family.120 Dr. Atalla is a practicing Muslim, and is
an active member of both his mosque and the greater Islamic community in
Phoenix.121 As a part of their faith, Dr. Atalla and his wife have made monetary
donations in various amounts to approximately sixty different organizations,
totaling over $130,000 between 2000 and 2010.122 Dr. Atalla and his wife assumed
legal permanent resident status in 1997, and after waiting the statutorily required
five years, they applied for U.S. citizenship in May 2002.123
Although Dr. Atalla’s wife quickly became a naturalized citizen,124 Dr. Atalla’s
application for naturalization dragged on. He was interviewed by USCIS three times
over the course of six years, finally receiving an application denial in 2008 on a
finding of “lack of good moral character.”125 Although one of the interviews was
114. Hamdi v. U.S.C.I.S., ACLU, http://www.aclusocal.org/hamdi/ [http://perma.cc/KEK8LCWV] (last updated May 10, 2012).
115. Trial Transcript at 27:7–20, Atalla v. Kramer, 2011 WL 2457492 (D. Ariz. June 6, 2011)
(No. CV09-1610-PHX-NVW)), ECF. No. 98.
116. Id. at 28:12–14.
117. Id. at 28:17–24.
118. Id. at 22:19–21.
119. Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Trial Transcript, supra note 115, at 22.
123. Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *1.
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id. at *6.
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not recorded, Dr. Atalla’s 2004 and 2008 naturalization interviews focused
extensively on Dr. Atalla’s volunteer work and donations to the Global Relief
Foundation (GRF).126
Dr. Atalla’s administrative appeal met with the same fate, when the USCIS
affirmed their denial on the grounds that Dr. Atalla had “provided false information
to obtain an immigration benefit” and “failed to disclose [his] association with
numerous organizations with ties to terrorism,” because “[o]ne who contributes
funds to an organization does have an association with that organization.”127 In
2009, Dr. Atalla filed an action in U.S. district court seeking de novo review of his
application for naturalization, and was finally granted citizenship in November
2011.
During the district court adjudication of Dr. Atalla’s naturalization application,
the Government repeatedly sought to show that: (1) Dr. Atalla provided false
statements in his naturalization interviews by denying that he was a member of or
associated with GRF; and (2) that he provided false statements by failing to disclose
his “associations” with the Holy Land Foundation, BIF, or the Islamic African
Relief Agency because he made monetary donations to those organizations. 128
Although the government appealed the district court’s grant of citizenship to Dr.
Atalla, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling in October 2013.129
III. SPECTER OF TERRORISM
At first glance, these stories seem eerily similar. Both men are married to U.S.
citizens and have four American-born U.S. citizen children. Both men are practicing
Muslims and are active members of their respective mosques and communities.
Both men applied for naturalization but were denied on the grounds that they could
not show the requisite good moral character.
But other than these surface-level similarities, Tarek Hamdi and Jamal Atalla
have little in common. Hamdi immigrated to the United States from Egypt, met his
Caucasian American wife in college in Boston, and spent thirty years as a legal
permanent resident before applying for naturalization. Atalla, on the other hand,
emigrated from Syria with his wife after they had both obtained medical degrees in
Damascus, and he and his wife applied for naturalization together at their earliest
possible opportunity.

126. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Global Relief Foundation as an
organization providing material support for terrorism under Executive Order 13,224 on October 18,
2002. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Department
Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation (Oct. 18, 2002), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3553.aspx [http://perma.cc/C8MX-3DF2];
see also Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *6–7.
127. Atalla, at *6 (quoting the N-336 Hearing Decision).
128. Id. at *15–16.
129. Atalla v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 541 F. App’x 760, 762 (9th Cir. 2013).
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The two men also lead vastly different lives. Hamdi works in the construction
industry in small California cities, while his wife raises their four children from their
home. In contrast, Atalla and his wife are both practicing doctors in Phoenix,
Arizona. When their naturalization applications were denied, Hamdi turned to the
ACLU for help, while Atalla hired a private attorney. Though they both donate to
charities and volunteer in their communities, Atalla donates much larger sums, more
regularly volunteers on long-term pro bono projects, sits on nonprofit boards of
directors, and has travelled abroad to found a medical clinic. One would expect that
an administrative inquiry into the moral character of an applicant would require a
thoughtful analysis of at least some of these factors. Yet, despite the vast differences
between these two applicants, USCIS rejected both claims based only on their
donations to Muslim charities.
Clearly, the Hamdi and Atalla cases do not stand for a condemnation of
charitable giving. The United States has subsidized charitable giving, including
donations to religious institutions, through tax deductions since 1917 as a means of
encouraging ongoing philanthropy.130 In fact, immigrants have historically pointed
to their volunteer service and charitable contributions when tasked with
affirmatively proving their GMC to immigration judges.131
Nor can the Hamdi and Atalla cases be construed as government disapproval
of donations to international causes or a condemnation of religious philanthropy.
Between 1990 and 2004, donations from individuals in the United States to charities
created or organized outside of the United States increased by 500%.132 Religion
has long driven philanthropy in the West, and the United States remains “one of
the most religious industrialized societies in the world.”133 In 2011, as is the case
every year, religious organizations received the largest share (nearly a third) of all
charitable donations made by individuals in the United States.134 As the scrutiny
over former presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s charitable giving has shown,
many Mormons tithe, giving ten percent of their income or more to the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 135 The Hebrew and Christian scriptures, the
Quran, and theological writing dating from the fourth century all laud caring for the

130. For a discussion and legislative history of the origins and development of the charitable
contribution tax deduction in the United States, see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable
Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 848–56 (2001).
131. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
132. See David J. Berardo, Practice Guide: How to Contribute to a Foreign Charity and Get a Tax
Deduction (Terrorist Traps for the Unwary), 29 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 116, 116 (2004).
133. D. Michael Lindsay & Robert Wuthnow, Financing Faith: Religion and Strategic Philanthropy,
49 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 87, 88 (2010).
134. GivingUSA, The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2011 Executive Summary, 57
GIVING INST. 1, 11 (2012) (“Every year, the religion subsector receives the largest share of charitable
dollars. In 2011, religious organizations received an estimated 32 percent of the total.”). In comparison,
education organizations, human services organizations, and health organizations received 13%, 12%,
and 8% respectively of American charitable contributions in 2011. Id. at 10.
135. Michael Paulson, To Tithe or Not to Tithe…, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/sunday-review/religions-inspire-charity.html.
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poor, stewardship, and giving regularly for the common good.136 Yet, USCIS has
shied away from denying naturalization applicants on the basis of undisclosed
donations to Christian, Jewish, or secular organizations.137
Analysis of the Hamdi and Atalla cases shows that the specter of terrorism is
driving administrative use of the GMC requirement for naturalization. Since 9/11,
the FBI has subjected thousands of individuals to “voluntary” interviews like the
one Tarek Hamdi attended in 2003, using information gained from these interviews
to prosecute Muslims for making false statements on issues unrelated to
terrorism. 138 In addition, the FBI has disproportionately targeted Muslim
naturalization applicants for significant secondary and tertiary security checks and
accompanying delays on top of the criminal background checks required for all
citizenship applications. 139 DHS and the FBI justify these policies and practices
using antiterrorism concerns, spurred by national public acceptance of the myth that
only Muslim-committed violence is terrorism.140
The Council on American-Islamic Relations has challenged the legality of the
FBI’s post-9/11 practices, forcing USCIS to close long-outstanding naturalization
applications held up at the FBI security check stage on stricter time frames.141 Tarek
Hamdi and Dr. Jamal Atalla, caught up in these delays, both received administrative
denials of their naturalization applications on the basis of lack of GMC. In response
to Hamdi and Atalla’s appeals before the U.S. district courts, the government’s
position in both cases was that the applicants failed to disclose their donations to
Muslim charities when asked to list all of the organizations they were associated
with on their N-400 applications for naturalization.142 This failure to disclose the
donations constituted provision of “false testimony for the purpose of obtaining
any [immigration] benefits,” a statutory bar to establishing GMC.143
As recognized by the district courts in each case, the government’s argument
fails on all counts. As the Supreme Court held and the government admitted in
Kungys v. United States,144 the false testimony bar to showing GMC was added by
136. Lindsay & Wuthnow, supra note 133, at 88.
137. PASQUARELLA, supra note 20, at 46.
138. Aziz, supra note 77, at 442.
139. See Musabji & Abraham, supra note 18, at 84–92 (discussing the FBI National Name Check
Program, implemented after 9/11 to screen applicants for U.S. citizenship).
140. See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 77, at 451–52 (2012) (discussing the backlash against DHS and
calling for the resignation of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano for a 2009 DHS report on “Rightwing
Extremism” warning of rising terrorism by right-wing domestic groups using the terms “white
supremacist” and “Christian fundamentalist,” contrasted with the relative lack of opposition to DHS
reports on Muslim extremists).
141. Musabji & Abraham, supra note 18, at 84–92 (discussing the CAIR litigation challenging
the FBI’s name check programs that have indefinitely delayed thousands of naturalization applications,
of whom “an overwhelming number” are Muslim); see, e.g., Yakubova v. Chertoff, No.
06CV3203(ERK)(RLM), 2006 WL 6589892 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006).
142. Hamdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 2012 WL 632397, at *4; Atalla, 2011 WL
2457492, at *2.
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f )(6) (2012).
144. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988).
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Congress to identify applicants who lacked GMC, not to prevent false pertinent
data from being introduced into the naturalization process.145 The government’s use
of this false testimony bar in Hamdi and Atalla cases serves to improperly shoehorn
national security concerns into the GMC requirement for citizenship. The ACLU’s
investigation into the CARRP program has revealed that USCIS officials were
specifically instructed to find pretextual reasons for ineligibility if no substantive
basis existed for applicants flagged as national security concerns.146 In addition, if
USCIS has legitimate national security concerns about a naturalization applicant,
denial of citizenship is not an effective way to safeguard national security, since
denied applicants are permitted to remain in the country as legal permanent
residents and can even reapply for naturalization at a later date.147
The Hamdi and Atalla cases stand as examples of how the DHS’s interpretation
of naturalization requirements inhibits us from operationalizing inclusive modes of
citizenship that would make a dynamic, diverse, and productive national citizenry.
The fact that the underlying basis for the denial of both applications was charity to
Muslim organizations suggests that citizenship in a community is not about abstract
values like allegiance, charity, and compassion; rather, it is about the culturally
specific ways in which those values manifest to benefit a particular community. Law
and Humanities scholar Leti Volpp’s analysis of citizenship as “cultural” and “anticultural” is useful here: “Citizenship positions itself as oppositional to specific
cultures, even as it is constituted by quite specific cultural values.” 148 The
government’s contention in both the Hamdi and Atalla cases, that it was not the
donations themselves but the misrepresentations to government officials that
indicated lack of GMC, seems insincere. It would not be unreasonable to speculate
that had the donations in question been made to organizations like the Boy Scouts
of America or the Salvation Army, there would be much less scrutiny over Atalla’s
and Hamdi’s alleged moral defects. The fact that the donations were made to
Muslim organizations arouses suspicion because it indicates sympathetic feelings
toward a community that has become persona non grata in the post-9/11 climate. In
this way, charity itself is not an absolute civic virtue; what matters is whether the
group that receives such charity is one that the larger community is willing to
recognize as a cultural member and therefore worthy of receiving charitable
assistance.
Evidence of this bias is manifested in the “specter of terrorism”149 tone that

145. Id.
146. ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH, supra note 78, at 3.
147. Julia Preston, Perfectly Legal Immigrants, Until They Applied for Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/12naturalize.html.
148. Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 574 (2007).
149 . See Order Granting-in-Part and Denying-in-Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397 (No. EDCV 10-894 VAP (DTBx)), ECF No. 93 (“Though the
Government raises the specter of terrorism, it does not argue that Hamdi himself is a terrorist, or a
supporter of terrorism, or otherwise a risk to national security. The Government argues only that Hamdi

Chin & Hassan_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

964

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

12/11/2015 10:57 PM

[Vol. 5:945

permeated the government’s arguments in the legal proceedings. As legal scholar
Frederick Schauer argues, we define ourselves through the exclusion of others.150
Schauer writes:
We use citizenship to strengthen our sense of national community by
making those who are citizens feel especially good about that status . . . .
In preferring some, we of course do not prefer others, and it is in a way
sad and in a way paradoxical that we hold ourselves together by fencing
others out.151
It is in this way that immigrants shape the definition of citizenship, even as they are
excluded from membership in that group.152
Volpp goes further in arguing that American national identity is formed in
response to “trauma” (i.e., 9/11 attacks), which has resulted in the redeployment of
Orientalist tropes to define “American” in opposition to “Middle Eastern, Arab, or
Muslim.” 153 Her point seems particularly true when we consider how different
Atalla and Hamdi actually were at the time of their respective naturalization
applications. They had different ethnicities and nationalities, occupied different
social status levels, belonged to different family compositions, and participated in
their local communities in different ways. Yet, none of these factors seemed to have
any bearing on the government’s consideration of whether they could demonstrate
GMC. The only issue that mattered was their financial support to Muslim charities.
In fact, the briefs submitted by the government in each case were virtually identical.
We can read these facts to mean that, in this political moment, no amount of

lied in an effort to gain citizenship, and therefore lacks the good moral character necessary to
naturalize.”).
150. See Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1504, 1517 (1986).
151. Id.
152. See Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 963,
965–66 (2000).
153. This racialization of a “Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim” identity has been discussed
extensively by scholars before and since 9/11. Among other flaws, this constructed identity ignores
other aspects of identity formation and through law and policy enacts and maintains racial hierarchy.
See Ali A. Mazuri, Is There a Muslim-American Identity?: Shared Consciousness Between Hope and Pain, 8 J.
ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 65, 67–68 (2003) (discussing “four identities” of Muslim Americans,
recognizing that Muslim is often a secondary or tertiary identity for Muslim Americans); see also Margaret
Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2005, at 215, 221
(citing Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of Race: “Arab, Muslim, and South Asian” Racial Formation After
September 11, 10 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61 (2005); and Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege:
Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 12 (2001))
(discussing the racialization of religious difference after 9/11 and the symbolic and material enactment
of hierarchy using legal initiatives). But see EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:
COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 195
(2d ed. 2006) (“Arab Americans may be suffering from a sort of collective punishment from whites by
being regarded as terrorists, as fundamentalist, as uncivilized or differently civilized, but I do not see
systematic evidence suggesting they are developing an oppositional identity such as that exhibited by
other minorities.”). See generally Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
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assimilation to Anglo-American culture can erase a person’s membership in a group
that has become the “other” against which “American” is defined.
It is also important to note the practical consideration that a tremendous
amount of resources were used to litigate the issue of naturalization in the Atalla
and Hamdi cases, even though the stakes on both sides were relatively low. When
an applicant loses an appeal of an N-400 application denial, the loss does not
permanently bar him or her from citizenship.154 The immigrant applicant remains
eligible to remain in the United States as a legal permanent resident (LPR) and to
reapply for naturalization at a later date.155 Because LPRs have a broad range of
legal rights, the government’s denial of citizenship status coupled with the
permission to remain in the country as an LPR threatens to create “denizens,” a
term used by Sociologist Yasemin Soysal to describe a new class of people who are
neither immigrants nor citizens.156 In writing about the social role of guest workers
in Western Europe, Soysal argues that the emergence of denizens has led to a
“decoupling of citizenship rights and identity.”157
Clearly, there is some larger function served by vigorous litigation of
citizenship. For both the naturalization applicant and the government, citizenship
is something of value. We can read the government’s efforts to prevent Hamdi and
Atalla from obtaining citizenship as a way of policing the social boundaries of
citizenship. If citizenship is a “test of how seriously we take the idea of the nation
as a relevant community,”158 then these case studies indicate that citizenship has not
lost its value over time, as “decline-of-citizenship” theorists suggest.159 If anything,
the expansion of removal laws and general restructuring of immigration law over
the past fifteen years has reshaped the definition and significance of citizenship.
Citizenship remains a useful tool for shaping the composition of a national
community, both by regulating who may be a “citizen” in the strictly legal sense and

154. See FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 10, § 22:26; see also Immigration and Nationality Act §
310(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012) (“A person whose application for naturalization . . . is denied, after
hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such
denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person resides in accordance
with chapter 7 of title 5. Such review shall be de novo . . . .”).
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).
156. See Gershon Shafir, Introduction: The Evolving Tradition of Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP
DEBATES: A READER 1, 18 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
157. Id. at 20.
158. Schauer, supra note 150, at 1505.
159. A term borrowed from Seyla Benhabib in her book, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents,
and Citizens. Benhabib uses this term to refer to theorists who argue that the rise of international human
rights and the expansion of globalization has led to the “devalue” of citizenship as an element of
political thought. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
115–16 (2004). For an example of this argument, see Peter H. Shuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The
Devaluation of American Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA 51 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
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by influencing who is a “member” in the social sense.160 Not only do unjustified
citizenship denials result in the maintenance of a narrowly defined citizenry, it also
functions to covertly chill First Amendment rights to free speech and association
by discouraging Muslim applicants for naturalization from becoming intimately
involved in their own religious organizations. In this political moment, citizenship
remains reserved for those who are best able to identify themselves as
“American”—a label that will remain inaccessible to Muslim, Middle Eastern, and
South Asian immigrants so long as the loosely defined War on Terror is waged
against those groups.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
Since its enactment, the GMC requirement for citizenship has served to
exclude “undesirable” immigrants from the polity. Though other bias-ridden
restrictions on American citizenship have since been repealed,161 GMC continues
to inject subjectivity and opportunity for bias into the naturalization process. Abuse
of the GMC provision should not come as a surprise—throughout American
history, facially neutral requirements have been applied in a discriminatory fashion,
particularly where, as here, they lack standards of application or allow for substantial
decision-maker discretion or interpretive subjectivity.162
Because the evolution of federal immigration law over time reflects America’s
changing social environments for immigrants,163 the targets of bias-based post-9/
11 implementation of the GMC requirement has targeted Muslim immigrants. The
farther we get from 9/11, the less our reactive policies, laws, orders, and strategies
are defensible without close scrutiny and a historically conscious, socially contextual
approach to national security. As Nina Crimm argued over five years ago, “[i]t is
time to consider more nuanced, targeted, and tailored designs for anti-terrorism . . .
strategies in order to mitigate the potential moral hazard of the current tactics.”164
We argue that five aspects of the GMC naturalization requirement require
close scrutiny and revision in order to minimize abuse of the GMC provision: (1)
the purposes and uses of the GMC requirement for naturalization; (2) the
appropriate burden of proving GMC; (3) the scope of decision-maker discretion;
(4) the vesting of decisional authority and decision-maker oversight; and (5) the
160 . For a discussion on “membership,” see Joseph H. Carens, Membership and Morality:
Admission to Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 159, at 31.
161. See, e.g., Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed Jan. 29, 1795)
(describing the limitation of naturalization to “free white person[s]”); see also Chinese Exclusion Act of
May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed Dec. 17, 1943) (implementing an ethnicity-specific exclusion
policy).
162. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing that facially neutral
employment practices can have discriminatory impact despite lack of discriminatory intent).
163. For an extensive documentation of the nativism driving changes in federal immigration
law policy in America, see generally PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND
NATIVISM IN AMERICA (2010).
164. Crimm, supra note 71, at 626.
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length of the statutory period for consideration. Finally, we propose all of these
recommendations with an eye toward the gradual adoption of a universalist
approach to citizenship.
A. Purpose and Use
First, any reconception of the GMC requirement for citizenship must consider
the contemporary purposes and uses of the requirement. In the late eighteenth
century, Congress hoped that it would serve to elevate the character of and establish
respect for the American name in international opinion. 165 Congress explicitly
disclaimed any intended reference to religious beliefs or connection between the
GMC language and religious opinions.166 The current use of the GMC requirement
to deny applicants naturalization because of charitable contributions to religious
organizations undermines the original intent of the provision.
Moreover, use of the GMC requirement in this manner fails to meet purported
national security goals. When the government punishes documented charitable
giving by Muslim immigrants to large Muslim charities in fulfillment of their
religious obligations, it unintentionally encourages secretive donations to less
reputable or lesser-known charities that may be under the government’s radar.
Furthermore, denial of a legal permanent resident’s naturalization application serves
only as a denial of an immigration benefit and does not trigger removal proceedings
or criminal consequences.167 To the extent that national security concerns animate
a finding that these legal permanent residents lack GMC, USCIS generally allows
immigrants denied naturalization to stay in the country as LPRs and reapply for
citizenship in five years with an entirely new statutory period for consideration.168
In addition, alternative paths exist to address concerns about terrorist
financing. Highly controversial “material support for terrorism” statutes already
provide a basis for DHS to investigate,169 charge, and prosecute individuals to meet
counterterrorism goals related to domestic financing of terrorist activities abroad.
If DHS can gather enough evidence to prosecute individuals on this basis, national
security concerns should be addressed with those statutes and not imported into
the naturalization process. Rather than allow the GMC provision to be used by
USCIS in discriminatory ways, Congress should clearly set forth the purpose and
permissible uses of the GMC requirement to prevent abuse.

165. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
167. See USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 8, at 12 (making no mention of
deportation or criminal proceedings following denial of naturalization of application in the “Frequently
Asked Questions” section of the guide to naturalization procedures).
168. See id.
169. For a critique of the Material Support laws, see Michael G. Freedman, Prosecuting Terrorism:
The Material Support Statute and Muslim Charities, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1113 (2010).
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B. Burden of Proof
Formulation of a workable GMC requirement for naturalization should also
pay careful attention to the way burdens of proof affect the implementation of the
GMC requirement. Applicants for naturalization generally must demonstrate their
eligibility for naturalization by a preponderance of the evidence.170 In its briefs in
the Atalla and Hamdi cases, however, the government argued that courts have
required applicants to prove their good moral character by “clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence.”171 The district courts in both cases rejected this argument,
affirming that an applicant’s burden of proving his or her good moral character, as
with all other naturalization eligibility requirements, remains “by a preponderance
of the evidence.” 172
Because one of the statutory bars to showing GMC is “providing false
testimony for the purposes of gaining an immigration benefit,”173 the burden of
proving GMC by a preponderance of the evidence already weighs heavily on
naturalization applicants. In Hamdi’s case, for example, every answer in Hamdi’s
unrecorded naturalization interview was held up for scrutiny as false testimony
under the aegis of a GMC determination. Hamdi and Atalla had to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that every word they uttered or wrote in their
naturalization interviews or on their applications was objectively true, and that any
misstatements or inaccuracies were subjectively not offered for the purposes of
gaining an immigration benefit.174 Should the Government gain traction with its
argument for a higher burden of proof at naturalization, one must wonder how any
applicant could prove GMC with clear and convincing evidence. Congress should
clarify by statute that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applies to the
GMC requirement for naturalization.

170. See United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that it is
“plainly true” that a naturalization applicant bears the burden of proving that he or she meets the
requirements for naturalization by a preponderance of the evidence); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(b) (2015) (“The
applicant shall bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets
all of the requirements for naturalization . . . .”).
171. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 31–32, Atalla v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 541
F. App’x 760 (2013) (No. 11-16987). As support for its argument in these cases, the Government
primarily relied on an interpretation of federal precedent indicating that naturalization applicants are
required to establish all aspects of his or her eligibility for citizenship by clear and convincing evidence.
See, e.g., Dicicco v. INS, 873 F.2d 910, 915 (6th Cir. 1989) (alien plaintiff must establish his eligibility for
citizenship by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence); see also Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., 385 U.S. 630,
637 (1967) (“[I]t has been universally accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his
eligibility for citizenship in every respect.”).
172. See, e.g., Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *10 (holding that Berenyi, 385 U.S. 360, relied upon by
the Government to argue for a “clear and convincing” standard, applies when the Government seeks
to strip a person of citizenship, but not to naturalization applicants); see also Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1168;
8 C.F.R. §§ 312.6(a)(7), (b).
173. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(f )(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f )(6) (2012).
174. See Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *10; Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *13–15.
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C. Scope of Discretion
A third issue that should be addressed with a reformulated GMC requirement
is the scope of discretion granted to the decision maker evaluating the character of
naturalization applicants. While statutory bars preclude applicants from establishing
good moral character, USCIS adjudicating officers may also bar an applicant’s
naturalization by finding that he or she lacks GMC as a discretionary matter.175 To
make discretionary findings, adjudicating officers are instructed to consider all
factors relevant to a case on a case-by-case basis, in relation to “U.S. law, Federal
regulations, precedent decisions and their interpretations, and General Counsel
opinions.” 176 Congress has never articulated a definition for GMC, leaving the
decision maker with entirely too much discretion to project and apply his or her
own morality when making a GMC determination. Reformulation of the GMC
requirement should curtail the scope of discretion allowed to decision makers—for
example, by advancing a positive definition of GMC or by promulgating an
exhaustive list of bars to showing GMC.
D. Decisional Authority
In addition to the scope of discretion, GMC reform should also consider the
identity of the decision maker vested with the authority to determine whether
applicants have the requisite character for citizenship. Before the 1990 transfer in
decisional authority from federal district courts to USCIS, the naturalization process
was considered judicial rather than administrative.177
Though jurists in the 1950s questioned their expertise in making GMC
determinations,178 judicial naturalization has the advantage of transparency. Publicly
available judicial opinions allow for public oversight of GMC determinations
through litigation as community conceptions of “good moral character” change
over time. This is particularly desirable in light of CARRP’s “deconfliction” process,
wherein USCIS officers are required to work with the law enforcement agency in
possession of “national security” information of the applicant—usually the FBI—
to determine whether the law enforcement agency believes the applicant should be
granted the immigration benefit sought.179 Though administrative determinations
may have efficiency benefits, courts have determined that GMC should be
measured by the standard of “average citizens of the community in which the
applicant resides.”180 The decision maker vested with the authority to make GMC
determinations must have the expertise to weigh GMC in relation to relevant legal
sources, but must also have the cultural competency to judge applicants by the
standards of their respective communities. Congress should consider transferring
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

USCIS, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 22, § 73.6(d).
Id. § 73.6(d)(3).
See supra notes 49–53, 65–67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
PASQUARELLA, supra note 20, at 1.
USCIS, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 22, § 73.6(a).
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decisional authority back to the judiciary, or providing some means of public
oversight and accountability over the administrative determination process.
E. Statutory Period
Last, reform of the GMC requirement should also consider the statutory
period for consideration. Under the INA and federal regulations, the statutory
period is five years, though consideration of conduct and acts outside the statutory
period is “specifically sanctioned by law if the applicant’s conduct during the
statutory period does not reflect reform of character or the earlier conduct is
relevant to the applicant’s present moral character.”181 The USCIS Adjudicator’s
Field Manual therefore instructs adjudicators to focus on conduct during the
statutory period, but to extend the inquiry to “the applicant’s conduct during his or
her entire lifetime.”182
As discussed by Kevin Lapp in his article, Reforming the Good Moral Character
Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, the immigration service and many courts have
historically taken “a redemptive view toward prior criminal conduct” when
evaluating an applicant’s GMC. 183 Focusing on character reform during the
statutory period, courts have found current GMC despite preperiod criminal
conduct such as armed robbery, breaking and entering with intent to commit
larceny, and manslaughter.184
Though recognition of reform is an admirable principle, the legal fiction
created by the five-year statutory period causes inconsistent and undesirable
outcomes. For example, the BIF donation focused on in the Hamdi case was made
in 2000, two years before the 2002–2007 statutory GMC determination period
relevant to Hamdi’s 2007 naturalization application. 185 Hamdi’s case thus shines
light on a striking predicament—whether and how a naturalization applicant can
demonstrate to an examiner’s satisfaction that he or she has “reformed” from a
charitable donation made seven or more years prior. The disparity between the
options available to applicants who have a prior history of violent criminal conduct
and applicants who previously made uninformed donations to charity shows that
the concept of reform or redemption assists some naturalization applicants while
leaving others permanently banned from naturalization. To offset these inconsistent
results, Congress should either strictly limit the statutory period for consideration
of GMC to the five years prior to application, or carefully circumscribe the

181. USCIS, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 22, § 73.6(a) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 316(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (2012); and 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2)).
182. USCIS, FIELD MANUAL, supra note 22, § 73.6(a).
183. Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J.
1571, 1587–88 (2012).
184. Id. at 1588 & nn.107-08 (citing Pignatello v. Att’y Gen., 350 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1965); and
Dadonna v. United States, 170 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1948)).
185. See Hamdi, 2012 WL 632397, at *4.
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situations in which examiners or judges may consider conduct preceding the
statutory period.
F. Adoption of a Universalist Approach to Citizenship
With the emergence of unprecedented globalization, many theorists have
called for a new understanding of citizenship. At the core of this new theory of
citizenship is the concept of “universal personhood,” which replaces the nationstate as the defining site of citizenship. 186 Advocates of this position include
scholars such as Linda Bosniak, who argues that “we should ‘maintain[ ] solidarity
with the powerless’ all over the world regardless of their citizenship.”187 Some have
taken the less radical view of “modest cosmopolitanism,” arguing that “despite our
duties of justice to all people, there will remain individual states, and citizens within
those states have more, stronger, and different duties to comembers than to
nonmembers.”188
Within the vast theoretical landscape of citizenship, we situate our ideal society
within the universalist school. Nation-based notions of citizenship are necessarily
accompanied by exclusionist politics, which are too easily and too often influenced
by racism, prejudice, and xenophobia. However, we recognize that our legal system
and prevailing political climate make an open-borders system unlikely to manifest
in the absence of some dramatic change. To that end, we support the modest
cosmopolitanism approach as a short-term strategy for reaching the long-term goal
of postnationalist citizenship. That is, a sincere embrace of multiculturalism would
require the gradual and persistent expansion of citizenship—both as a legal right
and as a civic value—to more and more groups until a nationalist vision of
citizenship would no longer be sustainable or even desirable. While the United
States portrays itself as the “melting pot,” we would argue that, at least when it
comes to the dispensation of legal rights, federal immigration policy has not sought
to include marginalized groups in the national community of citizens. Our case
studies demonstrate that the federal government has imported the prevalent antiMuslim prejudice from the sociopolitical sphere into the legal arena, the effect of
which is to reserve citizenship—in both its legal and civic sense—for those who
comply with dominant social pressures.
CONCLUSION
The Hamdi and Atalla cases reveal volumes about the nature of citizenship in
the present political moment. Not only do they demonstrate the ways in which
immigration policy continues to reflect foreign policy prejudices and ambitions, they
186. Shafir, supra note 156, at 20.
187. See Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 196 (2010)
(quoting Linda Bosniak, A National Solidarity?: A Response to David Hollinger, in IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 101, 104 (Noah M.J. Pickus ed., 1998)).
188. Id. at 178–79. For more on cosmopolitanism, see JON MANDLE, GLOBAL JUSTICE 88
(2006); and SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 111–30 (2001).
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stand as stark examples of how centuries-old anxieties about the foreigner permeate
contemporary national security concerns. The national trauma of 9/11 has resulted
in the social criminalization of entire ethnic groups and religions. Further, these
cases indicate that where the criminal justice system fails to physically remove
unwanted individuals from the community, the civil immigration system acts to
remove those undesirables from the political community by withholding the civic
rights that accompany citizenship. In so doing, the federal government is able to
police the boundaries of what it means to be a citizen and restrict which individuals
may call themselves Americans. Until our society is able to embrace the notion of
an open-borders global community, we advocate for the reconsideration of “good
moral character” as a requirement for naturalization. If the GMC requirement is to
remain intact, it must at least be applied in such a way that it achieves its intended
purpose: to enhance the meaning of what it means to be “American” without
prejudice to the faiths and ethnicities of immigrant applicants.

